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I. INTRODUCTION
Modem communications policy in the United States is focused on
fostering and encouraging the widespread deployment of advanced
communications networks to all American households. President
George W. Bush has established a goal of "universal affordable access
for broadband technology by the year 2007," and influential
policymakers, both Republican and Democrat, almost universally
share the aspiration that no community or group of citizens should be
without robust broadband network alternatives.2
While policymakers have zealously focused on the availability of
"broadband" functionality (e.g., faster Web surfing capability) to
households, many have failed to realize that fiber will not be widely
deployed solely to provide Internet access. In fact, revenue streams
from other types of communications services are critical for the
construction of advanced broadband networks. This paper explains
how policies which ensure entrants can readily provide video
programming services along with voice and data services, will
contribute substantially to the widespread deployment of advanced
communications networks, particularly in low-income neighborhoods.
In so doing, our findings provide empirical support for the assertion by
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") Chairman Kevin J.
Martin that additional multichannel video competition would also
"stimulate broadband deployment." 3
Ever since the Internet and the World Wide Web became a
significant business and mass-market phenomenon, there has been a
strong concern that a "digital divide" will emerge between rich and
poor, or urban and rural, consigning the digital "have-nots" to a
I The White House, A New Generation ofAmerican Innovation, special White House report,
April 2004, 11, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/technology/economic_
policy200404/innovation.pdf. Current FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin has made achieving
this goal one of his 'core priorities.' Statement of Chairman Kevin J. Martin, "In the Matter of
Petition of SBC Communications Inc. for Forbearance from the Application of Title II
Common Carrier Regulation to IP Platform Services," WC Docket No. 04-29 (May 5, 2005).
2 Concern over a "digital divide" appears to be bipartisan. A recent report by the
Congressional Research Service lists more than a dozen legislative proposals, introduced by
Republicans and Democrats alike, that share the goal of promoting more broadband
deployment, particularly in disadvantaged areas. Congressional Research Service,
"Broadband Internet Access: Background and Issues," IB10049 (June 9, 2005).
3 Leslie Cauley, "FCC Chief Considers Forcing Cable TV Competition," USA Today, August
22, 2005.
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backward, pre-Information Age subsistence.4 Similar concerns about
whether certain neighborhoods or groups would be left behind resulted
in "build-out" and "anti-redlining" rules that became conditions of
granting monopoly cable franchises. 5  But when applied to new
entrants, these altruistic requirements can be self-defeating and often
erect insurmountable barriers to entry for new firms.6 Build-out and
anti-redlining requirements are not imposed on new entrants in any
other sector of the telecommunications industry and are certainly not
the general rule in the U.S. economy. For example, a firm that wants to
compete with Wal-Mart is not required to build a store in every town
where a Wal-Mart exists.
Instead of extending anti-redlining and build-out requirements to
new entrants, public policy can combat the threat of a "digital divide"
and ensure more widespread deployment of advanced communications
networks by allowing entrants the freedom to bundle video with a
broadband offering. Adding video to the product mix increases the
4 For two examples of this viewpoint, see U.S. Department of Commerce, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration, Falling Through the Net: Defining the
Digital Divide, 1999 (describing problems of a rich-poor "digital divide"); see also U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, A
Nation Online: Entering the BroadbandAge, 2004 (expressing concern over potential rural-
urban divide for broadband services) (hereinafter NTIA NATION ONLINE REPORT).
5 Cable franchises are typically granted by municipal or county authorities under the pretext
that cable firms use public rights-of-way and should pay for their use. Prior to the 1992 Cable
Act, there was no prohibition against exclusive franchises. However, despite the dejure
prohibition against cable franchises (see, e.g., General Franchise Requirements, U.S. Code 47(2000), § 541(a)(1)), as discussed passim, build-out and other entry deterring requirements
nonetheless left a world of defacto exclusivity. For an interesting analysis of franchising in
cable television, see Oliver E. Williamson, "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies in
General and with Respect to CATV," Bell Journal of Economics 7 (1976): 73-104.
6 See, e.g., George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky and Lawrence J. Spiwak, "The Economics of
Build-Out Rules in Cable Television," Hastings Communications and Entertainment L. . 28
(2006): 207 (showing that ex ante "build-out" rules, when imposed on new entrants, deter
entry significantly and force new entrants to bypass communities entirely) and citations
therein. Indeed, the FCC recognized over ten years ago that the local cable franchising
process is "the most important policy relevant barrier to competitive entry in local cable
markets." Federal Communication Commission, "In re Implementation of Section 19 of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Annual Assessment of
the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming," FCC Rcd 9
(1994): 7442, app. H, 375ff.; see also Richard Posner, "The Appropriate Scope of Regulation
in the Cable Television Industry," Bell Journal of Economics 3 (1972): 98-129. Empirical
evidence of the negative effects of build-out requirements is provided in Thomas W. Hazlett
and George S. Ford, "The Fallacy of Regulatory Symmetry: An Economic Analysis of the
'Level Playing Field' in Cable TV Franchising Statutes," Business & Politics 3 (2001): 21-46.
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revenue potential of the network, thereby increasing entry. Expanding
the product mix to include video also substantially reduces the
payback period on the network investment. A shorter payback period
makes network investment less risky, so the firm will incur a lower
cost of capital (e.g., it can borrow at lower interest rates) and can
invest in more network building. Since low-income households
subscribe to video service at roughly the same rate as higher income
households, 7 the ability of entrants to offer video services substantially
improves the financial case for fiber deployment in low-income
neighborhoods. That is, while broadband service subscription is
highly sensitive to income, video subscription is not. Building modem
broadband infrastructure in low-income areas, consequently, becomes
relatively more attractive when the broadband provider can also
provide video services.
In this paper, we examine the network deployment decision for
new entrants by simulating how many households a new entrant would
build its network to ("households passed," in industry terms) and how
that network construction decision would be impacted by the type of
services the new entrant is able to sell over that network. We simulate
the network deployment decision in the State of Texas and this
simulation shows that a new entrant will pass substantially more low-
income households if that entrant can readily offer video with voice
and broadband Internet access services. If the new entrant's ability to
sell video services is sharply curtailed or delayed, it will pass fewer
low-income households with its network.8 In our simulation, video
7 See, e.g., Robert Kieschnick and B. D. McCullough, "Why Do People Not Subscribe to
Cable Television: A Review of the Evidence" (paper presented at the Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference, Virginia, October 4, 1998),
http://www.tprc.org/abstracts98/kieschnick.pdf.
8 Given ample evidence of various entry-deterring policies extracted at the franchise level by
local officials, Texas recently passed a law that abolishes local franchise requirements in favor
of a single, state-wide franchise administered by the Public Utility Commission. Texas
Legislature, Act Relating to Furthering Competition in the Communications Industry
(September 7, 2005), S.B. 5, 79th Leg., 2d Sess., enrolled version (Texas 2005). In so doing,
not only does this law end the ability for local politicians to extract entry deterring
concessions, but also considerably speeds up the entry process for new video competitors like
Texas local telephone companies AT&T or Verizon, who otherwise might have had to obtain
hundreds of local video franchises in order to sell cable video services to their existing
telephone customers in the state. Critics of the Texas law contend that the legislation will
"damage... communities," see Complaint, Texas Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v.
Perry, Case No. 05-CV-721-LY, U.S. District Court, Western District of Texas, filed
September 8, 2005, 23ff., and "divid[e] communities into the 'haves' and the 'have nots' of
advanced technologies." Texas Cable & Telecommunications Association, "TCTA Sues State
of Texas over New Telecom Law," news release, September 8, 2005, http://www.txcable.com/
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service takes on the role of a "silver bullet" - i.e., when the network
firm can bundle video, the percentage of poverty and minority homes
with access to the network rises substantially. Because we use a
number of assumptions, our simulation results should not be used to
assert that a certain level of penetration is achievable within any
particular time period. Our simulation is also based on a fiber-to-the-
home ("FTTH") network, which is not being deployed in all markets
across the country. Our simulation certainly indicates that policies that
make video competition more difficult will lead to significantly lower
deployment of advanced communications networks in low-income
areas than pro-entry video policies. These findings should not be
significantly implicated by any of the simplifications or limitations of
the simulation analysis.9
This paper is outlined as follows. In Section II, we present a
simple conceptual analysis showing the role bundling can have in
driving network deployment, particularly to low-income households.
In Section III, we present a computer simulation of network
deployment. This simulation will serve to illustrate and quantify the
importance to network deployment of having the ability to sell
multichannel video in a "triple-play" bundle. Concluding comments
are in the final section.
II. INCOME AND ACCESS: A CONCEPTUAL DISCUSSION
The U.S. telecommunications industry is entering an era in which
policymakers have chosen to rely on so-called "inter-modal"
competition between facilities-based, broadband networks that can
support a number of different services - most notably, video, voice,
News/PressReleases/PressRelease2005O9O8.asp. In our research, we find no evidence,
theoretical or empirical, to support this claim. The opposite, in fact, is true - removing the
franchise barrier to entry will lead to more network deployment, particularly to low-income
households.
9 Franchising, through both inherent bureaucratic delay and the extraction of political
concessions, is not the only barrier to entry in video markets. Other potential hindrances to
entry include the lax regulatory oversight over access to video programming, particularly
programming with vertical relationships with incumbent cable operators. See James W. Olson
and Lawrence J. Spiwak, "Can Short-Term Limits on Strategic Vertical Restraints Improve
Long-Term Cable Industry Market Performance?," Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 13 (1995): 283,
http://www.phoenix-center.org/library/progaccess.doc. Policymakers should not only focus
on removing legal barriers to entry like franchising, but they should also focus on breaking
down economic and operational barriers to entry, such as access to programming.
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and broadband Internet access. 10 Two theoretical observations from
that development are highly relevant to the present analysis. First,
markets with greater potential revenues can support more facilities-
based entry. 11  Since multichannel video is a highly-valued and
widely-consumed service, public policies that impede the sale of video
services by prospective entrants over new, multi-service networks will
unambiguously reduce entry. Second, entry is facilitated when new
technology permits owners to convert what traditionally were "single-
use" networks into "multi-use" networks and leverage their assets to
"spill over" into related markets. This is because such spillovers
reduce entry costs. 12 The combination of larger markets and spillovers
can produce substantially more entry.13 For the same reasons, public
policy that denies access to particular markets or limits the potential
revenues in serving a market will curtail network construction.
To illustrate further, we start our analysis with a simple
proposition: in a market economy, a firm will construct an advanced,
multi-service broadband network to a household (or group of
households) if the expected net revenues from the household (or group
of households) exceed the costs of deploying and providing access to
that network. Symbolically, if a household is expected to generate r in
net revenues and the up-front cost of access to the network is k, then
access will be provided when r > k. 14 Access is more widely available
10 George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky and Lawrence J. Spiwak, "Competition after
Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure and Convergence," Federal Communications L.J 59
(forthcoming Winter 2007).
11 More precisely, when we refer to revenue streams, we are talking about contributions to net
income, by which we mean incremental cash receipts exceeding incremental cash
expenditures.
12 See generally Ford, Koutsky and Spiwak, "Competition after Unbundling," supra note 10
(discussing spillover effects on entry).
13 Bundling also reduces risk, promoting entry in at least two other ways. Adding service
offerings to the network increases the chance that customers will purchase at least one service
from a network that passes their homes, so there is less downside risk to building the network.
Moreover, by offering multiple services, the provider faces less risk of being unable to recover
its investment should customers cease to be interested in a particular service (as has happened
with stand-alone long distance service, for example). Id.
14 Note that r is the present value of revenues over the investment horizon and are net of
marginal costs. All capital investments k are up-front, one-time expenditures. In this analysis,
we treat network construction as a one-time occurrence. In reality, network costs are incurred
over time as networks are maintained and expanded. Further, there exists a variety of factors
that influence the profitability of network construction including features of the tax code,
government subsidies, and other factors. The simplifying assumptions have no effect on the
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as r becomes larger relative to k (that is, r rises while k is constant, or k
falls while r is constant).
For many goods and services in the economy, and especially for
broadband Internet access, consumption rises with income (y). For our
purposes, we denote this relationship as r(y) - in other words, the
revenue a network owner can expect to receive from a household (or
group of households) is a function of that household's income (in this
case, a positive function of income).15  A household (or group of
households) will be offered service only if r(y) > k. This condition is
more easily satisfied when k is constant as income (y) increases.
Policymakers worried about a "digital divide" are, in essence,
postulating their concern that r(y) at low incomes will consistently fall
below k, so that a profit-maximizing firm will not provide service in
low-income areas. We illustrate the situation in Figure 1. In the
figure, dollars are on the vertical axis and income is on the horizontal
axis. As indicated in the NTIA NATION ONLINE REPORT, 16 revenues
for broadband Internet access services rise with income, as shown by
the line labeled r(y). For some capital cost k (which is unrelated to
income here), customers living in geographic areas with average
incomes less than y* will not be offered service (whether their home is
"passed" by the new network), while those consumers living in areas
with average incomes larger than y* will be offered service (their
homes will be "passed" by the new fiber network). Note that the seller
is not required to be driven by any ill motive to avoid low-income
areas - it is simply engaging in profit-maximizing behavior
encouraged by a capitalist economy. 17  Nevertheless, policymakers
may be legitimately concerned about whether households with
general implications of our theoretical analysis. Since we employ sophisticated cost models in
our simulation, many of these complexities are incorporated into the modeling effort.
15 We do not mean to imply that income is the only factor that impacts a household's spending
on communications services. As shown in the NTIA NATION ONLINE REPORT, supra note 4,
there are several other factors, specifically family size and age of children. We, however,
focus on household income because many policymakers are particularly concerned with that
demographic.
16 NTIA NATION ONLINE REPORT, supra note 4.
17 We do not adopt the term "redlining" here. "Redlining" is typically associated with
geographic discrimination. In our model, there is no discrimination per se, since the firm
provides service as long as r(y) > k regardless of race, religion, or any other factor.
"Redlining" is a more meaningful concept in mortgage markets, where the lender may base
decisions not on a customer's actual financial status, but rather on the customer's financial
status in a particular geographic location (say, a financially successful individual living in a
low-income neighborhood).
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incomes less than y* will have access to broadband services for social
and economic reasons that cannot be captured as profits by the seller.
Figure 1. The "Digital Divide"
Concern
$
y* y
The single-service analysis in Figure 1 is too simple for modem
communications networks. Firms today can build robust, multi-
service fiber networks that provide not only broadband Internet access
service but also video and voice services. The ability of these
networks to support services in addition to high-speed Internet access
influences the deployment of these networks and, as a result, the
availability of high-speed Internet access. Notably, the availability of
multiple services increases the potential revenues that a network
owner can receive from every household, even the poorest of
households. The simple ability to sell multiple products on a network
will decrease the potential for a "digital divide."
Figure 2 demonstrates the impact of bundling on network
deployment. Assume that k is the cost of providing broadband service;
if the firm provides video services, then capital costs increase by d. As
a result, the total capital cost per household to the firm for providing
the bundle is k + d. If we assume that the consumption of broadband
(Good 1) and video (Good 2) have identical average expenditures and
income relationships (r, = r2), then revenues for the "double play"
18 Our simulation below shows that a crucial component of this bundle is the availability of
multichannel video services. These services generate a lot of revenue for network providers.
As a result, the r(y) for every household, rich or poor, will be larger if multichannel video is
part of the "bundle."
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bundle will be r12 = 2r, = 2r2. In Figure 2, we add to Figure 1 the
revenue line for the bundle of broadband and video (r12).
19
Figure 2. Multi-Service Networks
Combat the "Digital Divide"
$12
k,//
In Figure 2, if d = k, then we have the line labeled k + d 2k, and
the equilibrium income level for service will again be y* (as in Figure
1). If d < k (that is, if there is a "spillover" effect, which we often
observe in multi-service fiber-rich networks), then the intersection of
k + d and r 12 will lie to the left of y*. For example, if the cost of
deploying the second service is one-half the cost of deploying the first
service, as with line k+d/2, then the average household income level at
which service will be provided falls from y* to y'. Figure 2 shows that
as long as some "spillover" effect reduces the investment needed for
the second service compared with providing it on a stand-alone basis
(that is, d < k), a firm will build out to more lower-income households
if it can sell a bundle than if it were limited to offering only one of the
two products. The ability to bundle Goods 1 and 2 increases the
potential market size, which shrinks the presence of a "digital
divide."1
20
Figure 2 shows that because of supply-side "spillover" effects,
bundling multiple services will result in a larger, more extensive
network-in industry terms, the network will "pass" more lower-
19 In the figures, we assume the two goods are bundled. But, the same effect can occur even if
the goods can be purchased as a bundle or individually as long as some households purchase
the goods as a bundle (or if Good 2 has higher average revenue than Good 1).
20 More widespread deployment is theoretically unambiguous. Since the goods can always be
sold separately, there can be no diminution in availability.
2007]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
income households (homes with incomes less than y*) if it can sell two
services than if the network owner were not permitted to offer both
services. The extent of this effect of course also depends upon the
shape of the demand curves for the services being examined. With
regard to bundles involving multichannel video services in particular,
an important demand-side factor is also at play: some studies have
shown that demand for video is far less tied to household income than
broadband Internet access service.
2 1
Figure 3 demonstrates this phenomenon. In Figure 3, r12 is the
same as in Figure 2 (that is, r = r2). The curve rl2b represents the
revenue-income relationship for the broadband/video bundle in
situations where the expenditures for Good 2 are not income sensitive
(illustrated by the flat line labeled r2b). In this case, r2b + rl = rl2b,
which is a significantly flatter curve than r 12 - meaning that
expenditures on the bundle of Good 1 and Good 2 are less-responsive
to income than in the previous example (line r12). Observe that if the
capital cost of the bundle is less than 2k (that is, if there are supply-
side "spillover" effects) then more low-income homes have access
with r12b than with r12. For example, at cost k+d, redlining falls to y"
with revenues rl2b, versus y' with revenues r12. Thus, including a
service with relatively low income responsiveness in the bundle will
lead to higher deployment to low-income households.
21 Kieschnick and McCullough, "Why Do People Not Subscribe to Cable Television," supra
note 7, at 9 ("We find little evidence to support the argument that many of the people who do
not subscribe to cable television services do so because they are unable to afford these
services. We find that while there is a positive relationship between household income and
household expenditures on cable television, this positive relationship is fairly small and
largely reflects the purchase of additional cable services, and not the initial decision to
subscribe to cable."). The General Accountability Office ("GAO") estimates a negative
income elasticity for cable service. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Direct
Broadcast Satellite Subscribership Has Grown Rapidly, but Varies across Different Types of
Markets, report prepared for the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 2005,
GAO-05-257 (hereinafter GAO STUDY), 35, table 3 (reporting a statistically significant
income elasticity for cable service of -0.3974).
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These examples show that, as a matter of theory, broadband
Internet access services will become more widely available to low-
income households when service providers gain the ability to sell
additional products that utilize the same fiber-optic network. This
model also shows that including multichannel video programming
service in a particular bundle can play a significant "balancing" role,
because consumption of multichannel video is less sensitive to
household income than is the consumption of broadband Internet
access. The ability to sell video services over a multi-service
broadband network increases the revenue potential from low-income
households substantially. Moreover, this effect on the economics of
broadband network deployment in low-income areas is greater than the
impact in high-income areas. As a result, easing restrictions on the
sale of video services over a broadband network will stimulate
relatively more broadband network deployment in lower-income areas.
Stated simply, bundling video with broadband service has a rather
pleasant impact on any "digital divide" - while video may be a
significant reason why a firm may build a fiber network to lower-
income neighborhoods, citizens in those neighborhoods will also gain
access to broadband Internet access services over that same network.
The converse is, of course, sadly true. If a firm is effectively
denied or delayed in the ability to sell video services over a broadband
network (through regulatory barriers like franchising or weak program
access rules), then it will have less incentive to build that broadband
network in less-affluent areas. Quite frankly, video revenues are vital
to the prospect that firms will rapidly deploy new, fiber-based
networks in poor and low-income neighborhoods in significant
quantities as required by the nation's goal of universal access by 2007.
Figure 3. Bundling and the
Digital Divide
$ r12 r12b
2k ....................................... ri l r2
k+d
A Lr2b
y" yy* y
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III. SIMULATION
The effect described above can be further illustrated through a
computer simulation. Using publicly available data published by the
U.S. Census Bureau and a forward-looking cost model of
telecommunications plant (the HAI 5.0 cost model), we can evaluate
the relationship between services bundling, subscriber income, and
service availability. 22 While the simulation could be performed on any
state (or multiple states), our focus for this analysis is the State of
Texas.23 We initially chose Texas because of its size and geographic
and income diversity. This choice was somewhat fortuitous since
while conducting our research the Texas Legislature passed a law that
makes it significantly easier for new entrants to provide video
programming services in that state. 24  The new Texas law ends the
local franchise process and provides a simple and streamlined
statewide video provider authorization process. Moreover, the law
does not impose a "build-out" requirement on new video programming26 ,,,
entrants in Texas. "Build-out" rules can significantly increase the
costs of a new video entrant and therefore make video entry
substantially less likely.
27
Our simulation is designed to examine the relative relationship
between video service availability and the construction of fiber-rich
22 We use a telecommunications cost model where the network uses copper loops, rather than
a true fiber-to-the-home model because the latter is not available. Limiting the cost
information from the model to loop plant should only provide acceptable estimates of relative
costs across markets. One benefit of using the cost model is that the cost estimates are
affected by factors that actually drive cost in particular areas (including the design of feeder
and distribution plants and geographic characteristics). We believe this to be a substantial
improvement over estimating costs based on a single factor such as population density.
23 We consider only the SBC region; it alone provides nearly 15,000 Census Blocks for
analysis, which is more than adequate for our purposes.
24 See Act Relating to Furthering Competition in the Communications Industry, supra note 8.
25 Id.
26 In doing so, the law brings the Texas multichannel video industry in line with existing
federal policy that prohibits "build-out" requirements for new entrants into the local telephone
industry. See In the Matter of The Public Utility Commission of Texas, CC Policy Docket
Nos. 96-13, 96-14, 96-16, 96-19, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC No. 97-346 (rel.
Oct. 1, 1997).
27 See Ford, Koutsky and Spiwak, "The Economics of Build-Out Rules in Cable Television,"
supra note 6.
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(fiber-to-the-home), multi-service broadband networks. As a result, it
makes a number of simplifying assumptions and should not be used to
argue or assert that any particular level of build-out or penetration by
any firm is achievable or profitable in any time frame. The simulation
models include simultaneous entry by two firms that construct
advanced communications networks capable of delivering (at least)
three services (broadband, digital telephony, and multichannel video).
For simplicity, we assume that the two networks enter at the same time
and are symmetric (i.e., serving exactly the same areas and dividing
the market evenly). Our simulation does not formally model synergies
or scope economies available to existing firms deploying new
networks, but that does not mean such synergies cannot be inferred
(i.e., the effect would be lower costs). Since synergies lower cost, the
presence of such synergies would result in more deployment.
We make a number of other simplifying assumptions such as
ignoring market growth and assuming instant subscription. We focus
on residential customers only. Since we are attempting to examine the
extent to which network construction would occur "naturally" without
any external regulation, we assume that there are no build-out
requirements on either entrant. Demographic data used for the model
is from the Census Block Data for the State of Texas, which allows us
to simulate income-sensitive revenues.28 Finally, we use 1990 Census
data because that data aligns with the network cost model that we use,
HAI Model 5.0a, which has been employed in various forms by many
state public utility commissions in setting rates.
Because of these simplifying assumptions, we do not (indeed, we
cannot) project any particular level of availability or penetration in
today's environment. Our simulation is simply that - a simulation.
One should not infer from this simulation or the tables that follow that
a particular penetration rate will be realized, as a number of other
factors are at work. Importantly, in today's environment, the vast
majority of households receive multichannel video from the incumbent
cable company, and many of those incumbent cable companies have
vertical programming relationships with the most-popular cable
programming networks. Our simulation does not attempt to model the
challenges that this situation presents for a new, fiber-based entrant.
Moreover, it is not the purpose of this study to show that a "digital
divide" is either present currently or eliminated by any particular set of
policies.
28 The simulation evaluates Census Blocks in Texas using the 1990 STF3 data. From the
STF3 files, we extract households, white households, poverty households, and median income.
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That said, our analysis does show that - without much question - a
new entrant will deploy broadband Internet access services more
widely in low-income neighborhoods if that entrant can freely bundle
multichannel video and voice services with broadband Internet
service. As illustrated in the previous section, this result is undeniable.
This simulation shows that this effect is also significant.
In the following sections, we outline our benchmark case and
present the results of the simulation. Appendix A contains sensitivity
analysis on many of the inputs.
A. SUPPLY SIDE
The purpose of the simulation is to evaluate the role of bundling
multiple services on household access to advanced communications
services, with a focus on access differentials by income. We begin by
specifying the supply-side of the simulation. At present, there are no
highly-disaggregated cost studies of advanced communications
networks. We do have, however, forward-looking cost estimates for
traditional, copper-based telephone networks and these models provide
estimates down to the Census Block level.29 While the level of cost
for such networks may not be appropriate for a fiber-rich network,
such models likely render acceptable approximations of relative costs
across geographic areas. 30 If so, then we can scale the level of cost
from these models to match better the advanced communications
network.
Say, for example, we know that kF is the true mean cost of the
fiber-optic network, but we do not have the distribution of /F across
Census Block Groups (the kF for all i blocks). We do have
disaggregated estimates of costs from a forward-looking cost model
for a copper-based network (kic) with mean cost kc. Assuming that the
relative cost across Block Groups is the same for both / and kc, if we
then scale the cost estimates kic by the ratio e{/ kc, then we have
legitimate disaggregated cost estimates kiF. This approach is employed
her.3
1
29 For this study we use the Census Block Group estimates of loop costs from the HAI
Model 5.0a.
30 We use loop costs to proxy relative cost differentials.
31 While this method is not perfect, it is likely to produce sufficiently good approximations of
the cost distribution for the purposes of this simulation. Again, we are trying to illustrate the
importance of adding video to the suite of services offered by an advanced communications
network, not attempting to provide accurate forecasts of terminal penetration rates.
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We divide capital costs into two rn~jr categories. First, we
assume the average cost to pass a home (k ) is $600, and these costs
vary across Census Blocks according to forward-looking cost
estimates. For Texas, these costs range from $61 to over $32,000,
depending on population density and other relevant characteristics. In
addition, we assume that each house connected to the network costs
the firm an additional $1000 in labor and materials. 32  For other
services, we assume telephone investment is $100 per household, and
that the incremental investment to add video to bundle is $200 per
household (from above, these costs are indicated by the variable ).33
For our simulation, the per-home incremental capital cost for
broadband service (k) averages $1600 by design, $1800 for broadband
and video, $1700 for broadband and telephone, and $1900 for all three
services. We account for operating costs using margin assumptions as
detailed in the next section. A sensitivity analysis of the cost
assumptions is provided in Appendix A.
B. DEMAND SIDE
The revenue-income relationships for our three goods (broadband,
voice, and multichannel video) are from published information.
Expected revenue per household is computed as p.e.f, where p is the
probability of purchase (the penetration rate in the block), e is annual
expenditures, and f is a present value factor. Both p and e can be
functions of income, andf is the discount factor for 15 years at a rate
of 10% (sof= 7.61).
For broadband, the relevant demand-side relationships are
32 Using this approach, we derive an average cost of connecting a home to a new fiber-optic
network of approximately $1600. This average cost figure is consistent with recent studies on
the cost of fiber networks including current deployments of fiber-to-the-home. See,
e.g.,Render, Vanderslice, & Associates, LLC, Fiber-To-The-Home, The Third Network,
FTTP/FTTH 2004/2005 (Tulsa, OK: 2004); IGI Group, FTTP: Going Strong for 2005
(Brighton, MA: 2005); Carol Mattey, Deloitte & Touche LLP, "Are Multiple Broadband
Infrastructures Sustainable: Key Characteristics of Competing Broadband Platforms" (paper
presented at the Columbia Institute for Tele-Information, New York, June 23, 2005); Anupam
Banerjee and Marvin Sirbu, "Towards Technologically and Competitively Neutral Fiber to the
Home (FTTH) Infrastructure," (working paper, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA,
2003), http://itc.mit.edu/itel/docs/2003/banerjeesirbu.pdf; Ken Poultin, "The Palo Alto Fiber
to the Home Trial: A Work in Progress" (paper presented at the CANARIE's 5th Annual
Advanced Networks Workshop, Toronto, ON, November 1999).
33 See, e.g., Gerry Blackwell, "IPTV: The Big Picture," ISP-Planet, April 15, 2005,
http://www.isp-planet.com/research/2005/iptv.html; see also Mattey, "Are Multiple
Broadband Infrastructures Sustainable," supra note 32.
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Pb = (-1.548+0.2024-1ny)/2
eb = (240+0.0033y).0.5
f= 7.61
rb =Pb'ebf
where both Pb and eb are functions of income (y). For the calculation
of Pb, the numerator is aggregate penetration, so we divide by two to
reflect the entry of two firms. 34  Expenditures average $20 at the
lowest income level rising linearly to an average of $60 at the highest
income level.35 The profit margin (or contribution to fixed costs) is set
at 50% of gross household expenditures, explaining the 0.5 scalar in
the eb calculation.
For multichannel video, the demand-side relationships are
Pv = 0.70/2
e, = (-2253.71+314.869.1ny).0.5
f= 7.61
r, =pv'ev f
where, only e, is a function of income. Econometric studies
consistently show a weak relationship (if any) between income and
basic cable demand, and we incorporate this finding in our
simulation.36  Again, we have symmetric duopoly, so the assumed
aggregate penetration of 70%, which two firms evenly share, is
divided by 2.37  Some surveys indicate that expenditures on
multichannel video, however, do typically rise with income (but others
find no relationship).38 To be conservative, we specify the expenditure
34 The function forpb is from an informal "best fit" analysis of penetration/income data
presented in the NTIA NATION ONLINE REPORT, supra note 4, at table 1. We use "all Internet
use" for the penetration rate, explaining the $20 monthly revenue for the lowest income
groups.
35 Broadband providers today offer bandwidth options for users. See also Mattey, "Are
Multiple Broadband Infrastructures Sustainable," supra note 32 (listing ancillary services for
broadband connections).
36 See Kieschnick and McCullough, "Why Do People Not Subscribe to Cable Television,"
supra note 7; see also GAO STUDY, supra note 21.
37 Our approximation of aggregate penetration of 70% is based on current data from the
National Cable Telecommunications Association website which claims that the average
household penetration of cable systems is 66.8%. National Cable Telecommunications Web
Site, http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=86.
38 Kieschnick and McCullough, "Why Do People Not Subscribe to Cable Television," supra
note 7. A recent survey by the Pew Internet & American Life Project indicates that minority
households spend more on multichannel video than white households. Since, on average,
white incomes are higher than minority incomes, this finding suggests that low-income
households may actually spend more on multichannel video than high-income households.
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level e, to be a function of income.39 The profit margin (or
contribution to fixed costs) is 50% of gross household expenditures,
explaining the 0.5 scalar in the e, calculation.
40
For telecommunications service, we assume that average monthly
revenues are $20 per household, and that 80% of homes that buy either
broadband or video service also purchase telephone service in a
bundle.41 Income has no effect, which is plausible with a low-priced
($20), unlimited calling package. The profit margin on the service is
30%.
Thus, our assumptions are conservative in relation to the effect of video on deployment. See
John B. Horrigan, Consumption of Information Goods and Services in the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Pew Internet & American Life Project, 2003),
www.pewintemet.org/report-display.asp?r= 103.
39 The expenditure function ev is an informal "best fit" least squares estimation using data
from Kieschnick and McCullough, "Why Do People Not Subscribe to Cable Television,"
supra note 7, which we scale so that the simple average expenditure is $80 per month. We use
only income groups with an upper income bound (a use that is bound in the analysis). The
mean of $80 matches reported average revenue per subscriber in Horrigan, Consumption of
Information Goods and Services in the United States, supra note 38. Statistics on the NCTA
website indicate a mean of $95 per cable subscriber, adjusting out revenues from broadband
and telephone services (assuming $50 per unit). Cablevision, Inc., reports average revenue per
video subscriber of $87.17. Cablevision Systems Corporation, "SEC Form 10-K" (March 16,
2005): 4, www.secinfo.com/dVut2.z6wd.htm. This mean includes an adjustment for
advertising revenue. NCTA reports advertising revenue is about 25% of industry revenue.
The household-weighted average revenue per subscriber in the simulation is $74.
40 Publicly-traded cable operators report gross profits and EBITDA margins in the 40-65%
range.
41 Cable systems currently offer digital telephone service for about $40, and reputable VolP
operators offer a full suite of digital telephone services for about $25 to $35 per month. See,
e.g., Vonage Web site, www.vonage.com and AT&T Web site, www.att.com. We assume
80% of subscribers to voice service purchase it from the wireline duopolists in our simulation,
leaving the remainder of the voice market to wireless and other carriers (such as VolP
retailers). See, e.g., Sun Microsystems, Telcos Stake Their Claim in the VoIP Market,
November 2005, http://www.sun.com/solutions/documents/articles/te voipaa.xml?facet=- 1
('people will tend to buy VolP service from their broadband provider, it's just a logical
progression ').
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
(1990 Census Data)
Block Groups by Poverty Minority pass Median
Median Income Homes Homes Homes Income
Range
y < 20,000 1,155,258 398,950 439,657 628 14,772
20,000 <y <30,000 1,586,374 230,077 355,874 672 24,679
30,000 <y <40,000 1,086,930 81,544 164,243 584 34,352
40,000 <y <50,000 626,473 25,585 77,614 512 44,095
50,000 < y <60,000 284,354 7,715 22,053 483 54,012
60,000 <y <70,000 153,034 3,601 9,572 483 64,025
70,000 <y <80,000 79,172 1,520 3,864 449 74,775
80,000 <y <90,000 33,438 480 1,534 463 83,600
90,000 <y <100,000 14,976 368 458 457 93,633
100,000 <y <125,000 16,444 234 573 428 108,583
125,000 <y <150,000 7,808 107 180 428 134,951
y > 150,000 6,251 183 148 435 150,001
In Table 1, we present some descriptive statistic,cluding k
estimates by income group. The table shows that k is inversely
related to income (p = -0.84, based on the table values); lower income
households are generally located in higher cost areas. 4  Thus, to some
extent, higher costs and not simply lower revenues may explain
reduced access to the network in low-income areas.
43
C. RESULTS
Whether or not advanced communications are available to a
particular household (or, more appropriately for the simulation, a
group of homes in a Census Block) depends on whether the total
revenue from homes in the Census Block exceeds the total investment
required to serve the Block. On a per-household basis, this implies
42 This high correlation coefficient is in part due to the aggregation into groups. For the
individual Census Blocks, there is virtually no linear correlation between income and cost (p
= -0.064), but there may be a non-linear relationship (thus causing the correlation in aggregate
data).
43 This correlation is state-specific and may be different in various states. For example, in
many New England states, the correlation is reversed, with poorer homes being located in the
more densely populated urban centers.
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that a Census Block has access if the average expected revenues
exceed the average expected investment (i.e., r > k from Section II).
For the benchmark case, the results of the simulation are in Table
2, where we present the results as the percent of households passed by
income group for four service offerings: (a) broadband service alone;
(b) broadband and telephone service; (c) broadband and video service;
and (d) all three services. All results are, of course, conditional on our
benchmark assumptions. Appendix A contains a sensitivity analysis of
key assumptions.
Table 2 shows a great deal of variability in service availability
depending on the components of the service offering. Under our
benchmark assumptions with broadband only, the two networks serve
very few homes, and the networks pass no homes in areas with median
incomes of less than $50,000. Obviously, the "broadband only" option
leads to a sizeable "digital divide." Even at higher income levels,
network coverage is limited for the broadband-only option.
As more services enter the firm's product mix, however, the role of
income as a determinant of availability diminishes. If telephone
service is bundled with broadband, then availability rises sharply
across many income groups. Yet, a substantial "digital" divide
remains. No home in a Census Block with a median income of less
than $40,000 would have access to the network; only about half of the
homes in blocks with median incomes in the $70,000 to $80,000 range
would have access.
The most sizeable impact on network coverage happens when the
network provider adds video services to its product mix. An offering
of video and broadband services shrinks the potential for a "digital
divide" considerably. In our simulation, 84% of the lowest-income
Census Blocks have access to the multi-service broadband network,
and neighborhoods with median incomes of more than $40,000 have
near ubiquitous access (98% or more).
A bundle of all three services - voice, data, and video - does even
more to eliminate the potential for a "digital divide." Homes in the
lowest income group have an 88% access rate, and virtually every
Census Block with a median income of $40,000 or more has access.
The difference in availability between the three-service bundle and a
"broadband only" offering is staggering. With a "triple play," all
income groups have very good coverage, and low-income households
have substantially more access than they would have if video services
were not offered. The simulation illustrates clearly the importance and
value of bundling video and other services as an antidote for the
"digital divide."
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Block Groups by
Median Income
Range
Table 2. Percent of Homes Passed
(a) (b) (c)
Homes Passed Homes Passed Homes Passed
Broadband Broadband + Broadband +
Only Telephone Video
y < 20,000 - 0.84
20,000 <y <30,000 - 0.88
30,000 <y <40,000 0.93
40,000 <y <50,000 - 0.04 0.98
50,000 <y <60,000 0.01 0.09 1.00
60,000 <y <70,000 0.02 0.20 1.00
70,000 < y <80,000 0.09 0.54 1.00
80,000 < y <90,000 0.14 0.76 1.00
90,000 <y
<100,000 0.34 0.92 1.00
100,000 <y
<125,000 0.83 1.00 1.00
125,000 < y
<150,000 0.97 '0.97 1.00
y > 150,000 1.00 1.00 1.00
A review of the detailed simulation results indicates that a lack of
access to the network when video is provided is driven more by costs
than income (the latter being the sole driver of revenues). The average
annual expected net revenues for homes passed versus homes not
passed is only 7% larger ($265 versus $247).44 In contrast, the cost
difference between the groups is enormous. Between the two groups,
the average k is $857 in served areas whereas the average k in areas
not served is $2685 (a 213% difference). 45 Obviously, cost - and not
income - is the primary driver of a lack of access in the simulation.
Another interesting statistic from the simulation is the recovery speed
of the upfront investment. If the firm is able to offer all three services
over its network, then the firm recoups its upfront investment in about
one-third of the time that it would take to recoup from a "broadband-
44 The average is computed as a household weighted average.
45 These cost figures are average capital costs per home, so the connection and incremental
service costs are weighted by the expected penetration.
(d)
Homes Passed
Broadband +
Telephone +
Video
0.88
0.90
0.95
0.99
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
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only" build.46 Accelerated cost recovery improves the business case
for building a broadband network and substantially reduces the risk of
the endeavor.
The increased deployment due to the firm expanding its product
mix to include video is particularly significant for low-income and
minority households. Figure 4 summarizes the availability of service
for households with income below the poverty line and minority
homes.47 "Digital divide" studies often report access statistics based
on these demographic traits. If multichannel video services cannot be
sold over the broadband network, then our simulation shows the
potential for a significant "digital divide," because only a small
percentage (less than 1%) of poor and minority homes gain access to
the advanced communications network. Even adding telephone
service to the product mix does not improve penetration for these
households. Adding video to the product mix, however, makes for a
dramatic change in the availability of service to poverty and minority
homes. Video service takes on the role of a "silver bullet" - i.e., in our
simulation, when the network firm can bundle video, the percentage of
poverty and minority homes with access to the network rises from
nearly zero to about 90%. The impact of video availability on whether
poor households have access to broadband services is considerable and
should not be ignored by policymakers.
46 We note, however, that our simulation shows that in many areas, it may still take several
years for the entrant to recover the cost of the network.
47 These figures are based on the relevant household count from Table 1 and the penetration
rates from Table 2.
2007]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Figure 4. Percent of Below-Poverty and Minority Homes
Passed
[]Poverty Homes 87% 88% 90% 91%
' Minority Homes
0.1% 0.2% 1% 1%
Broadband Broadband Broadband Broadband
Telephony Video Telephony
Video
Reviewing the results summarized in Table 2 and Figure 4, the
simulation clearly illustrates the point that offering video with
broadband service will expand availability across income groups.
While we cannot claim a high degree of accuracy on the reported
terminal penetration rates from the simulation, the expansion effect
predicted by the simulation is substantial and undeniable. These
results are unsurprising given that video services generate expected
revenues that, on average, are much larger than the expected revenues
from broadband services.
Unlike mandatory build-out requirements, which deter entry,
allowing entrants easy access to multichannel video services has no
downside. Therefore, a public policy of free entry into video markets
seems to be a more logical first step in ensuring the widespread
deployment of broadband networks. Further, mandatory build-out
requirements may be senseless in the context of statewide, or
nationwide, franchise arrangements, or when the entrant is an existing
network provider (such as a local phone company).48 In Texas, for
example, there are about 60 local phone companies. It would be
ludicrous to require all 60 carriers to build-out to the entire state, since
48 Federal Communications Commission, FCC Universal Service Monitoring Report, CC
Docket No. 98-202, December 2003, at Table 3.23,
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/monitor.html.
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it would not be profitable for the firms to do so. Nor does it make
sense to require a region-wide build-out, since some entrants may be
entirely new to the market and may not have existing networks in a
"region." Additionally, local telephone exchanges and cable television
franchise markets are not geographically identical. Thus, a build-out
requirement based on existing cable franchise boundaries may raise
entry costs by forcing a telephone company entrant to expand well
beyond its existing markets and infrastructure (which would rob the
system of its spillover).49 Entry-promoting policies for video services,
alternately, have a powerful effect on broadband network deployment
and carry no baggage.
D. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
These reported results are the consequence of the particular
assumptions and algorithms of the simulation. In an effort to illustrate
the effects of particular assumptions, we summarize a sensitivity
analysis in Appendix A. We do not provide sensitivity analysis for a
number of key assumptions, such as simultaneous entry and symmetric
firms. Some features of the simulation are too complex to evaluate
using sensitivity analysis, and quantifying their effect would require a
new, more sophisticated simulation. That said, the driving forces of
this simulation and any other reasonable simulation of this issue
should produce very similar results in a general sense. Accordingly,
any simulation, no matter how simple or complex, should indicate that
if a firm can provide more services over a network, then the profit
opportunities of the firm are enhanced and, as a consequence, the
geographic coverage of the network is expanded.
We also performed the simulation usinj cost data for the states of
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. Despite the significant
variation in density and geography across these states, the results were
not materially different from those presented in Table 2 and Figure 4.
Adding video to the bundle of services dramatically increased the
deployment of the broadband network, and this increase was largest in
low-income areas. Therefore, it seems reasonable that our findings are
49 C.f., LLC v. City of Otsego, 664 N.W.2d 390 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
50 The results of these simulations may be found at the Web Site for the Phoenix Center for
Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies, www.phoenix-center.org/:
http://www.phoenix-center.org/PolicyBulletin/NewJerseyTestimonyFinal.pdf (New Jersey),
http://www.phoenix-center.org/KoutskyPATestimonyFinal.pdf (Pennsylvania), and
http://www.phoenix-center.orglpcpp/PCPP23AddendumMaryland.pdf (Maryland).
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not state specific, and the results can be extrapolated to any geographic
area without significant reservation.
We do not devote much attention to the results of the sensitivity
analysis - the results are as expected (and robust). Higher revenues
and lower costs increase network deployment, and lower revenues and
higher costs reduce network deployment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Republicans and Democrats alike are nearly unanimous in arguing
that all Americans should have access to broadband Internet access
services. Policymakers fear that consumers without access to this
service will increasingly be "passed by" the Information Age - and
that those consumers and their children will lose critical educational,
employment, and entertainment opportunities.
In this paper, without disputing the social value of ubiquitous
broadband deployment, we show that there is an important linkage
between the bundling of video programming services and broadband
Internet access services. The right set of policies - i.e., policies that
facilitate and promote the ability of broadband networks to provide
video directly to consumers - will result in wider deployment of
broadband Internet services and, in particular, wider deployment in
low-income neighborhoods.
The theory demonstrating this relationship builds upon the key
insight: the more potential revenues that the network can generate in a
household, the more likely it is the network will be built to that
household. As a result, it is readily apparent that video can be the key
driver in making deployment profitable, and video capability will in
turn make broadband Internet access services over that same network
platform more readily available. It follows, therefore, that any policy
that makes it difficult or costly for a network firm to sell multichannel
video services, through either an onerous local franchising process or
lax program access regulations will, without a doubt, result in less
deployment of advanced communications services, including
broadband Internet access. Further, these hindrances to offering video
services are particularly detrimental to deployment in low-income
areas.
We reiterate that because we use a number of simplifying
assumptions in our simulation, our simulation results should not be
used to assert that a certain level of penetration is achievable within
any particular time period in any particular place. The simulation is
intended, primarily, to show the relative rather than the absolute levels
of network deployment with and without video services in the bundle.
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In that regard, the simulation analysis reveals that video may be the
"silver bullet" for making broadband networks more broadly available
across households of all income levels.
APPENDIX A: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
A sensitivity analysis of core simulation assumptions is
summarized in the tables below. The labels of the columns match that
of Table 2. All simulations assume that all other factors remain
constant.
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Percent of Homes Passed
/ a = 700 /kP 500
Income (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Range
y < 20k 0.80 0.85 - - 0.88 0.91
20k <y <30k - - 0.86 0.88 - 0.01 0.91 0.92
30k < y <40k 0.91 0.92 - 0.03 0.96 0.96
40k <y <50k 0.01 0.97 0.98 - 0.10 0.99 0.99
50k < y <60k - 0.04 0.99 0.99 0.03 0.20 1.00 1.00
60k < y <70k 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.52 1.00 1.00
70k <y <80k 0.05 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.21 0.79 1.00 1.00
80k < y <90k 0.03 0.37 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.92 1.00 1.00
90k<y <100k 0.20 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.92 1.00 1.00
100k <y <125k 0.54 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00
125k<y<150k 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
y > 150k 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
kconnect= 1200 kconnect = 800
Income (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Range
y<20k 0.81 0.87 - 0.87 0.90
20k < y <30k 0.88 0.89 0.02 0.89 0.91
30k < y <40k - 0.92 0.94 - 0.05 0.94 0.95
40k < y <50k 0.98 0.99 0.01 0.12 0.99 0.99
50k < y <60k 0.03 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.21 1.00 1.00
60k < y <70k 0.05 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.47 1.00 1.00
70k < y <80k 0.04 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.24 0.76 1.00 1.00
80k < y <90k 0.03 0.35 1.00 1.00 0.46 0.92 1.00 1.00
90k < y <100k 0.20 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.92 1.00 1.00
100k < y <125k 0.54 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00
125k < y <150k 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00
y > 150k 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Percent of Homes Passed
Pb +10% Pb -10%
Income (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Range
y < 20k - 0.85 0.89 0.83 0.88
20k < y <30k 0.01 0.89 0.90 - - 0.88 0.90
30k < y <40k 0.03 0.94 0.95 - 0.93 0.94
40k < y <50k 0.10 0.98 0.99 - 0.01 0.98 0.99
50k < y <60k 0.03 0.17 1.00 1.00 0.04 1.00 1.00
60k < y <70k 0.06 0.44 1.00 1.00 - 0.06 1.00 1.00
70k < y <80k 0.21 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.21 1.00 1.00
80k < y <90k 0.46 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.35 1.00 1.00
90k < y <100k 0.63 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.55 1.00 1.00
100k < y <125k 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.83 1.00 1.00
125k < y <150k 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00
y > 150k 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00
Pv +10% pv -10%
Income (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Range _____________
y < 20k - - 0.87 0.90 0.80 0.86
20k < y <30k - 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.88
30k < y <40k - 0.95 0.96 - 0.92 0.93
40k < y <50k - 0.04 0.99 0.99 - 0.04 0.98 0.98
50k < y <60k 0.01 0.09 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.09 0.99 1.00
60k < y <70k 0.02 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.02 0.20 1.00 1.00
70k < y <80k 0.09 0.54 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.54 1.00 1.00
80k < y <90k 0.14 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.76 1.00 1.00
90k < y <100k 0.34 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.34 0.92 1.00 1.00
100k < y <125k 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00
125k < y <150k 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00
y > 150k 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2007]
US: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Percent of Homes Passed
All Revenue +10% All Revenue -10%
Income (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Rage ____________
y < 20k 0.88 0.90 - 0.79 0.85
20k < y <30k - 0.01 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.88
30k < y <40k - 0.04 0.95 0.96 - 0.91 0.92
40k < y <50k - 0.12 0.99 0.99 - - 0.97 0.98
50k < y <60k 0.03 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.99 0.99
60k < y <70k 0.06 0.52 1.00 1.00 - 0.05 1.00 1.00
70k < y <80k 0.21 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.20 1.00 1.00
80k < y <90k 0.46 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.03 0.32 1.00 1.00
90k < y <100k 0.63 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.20 0.53 1.00 1.00
100k < y <125k 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.54 0.83 1.00 1.00
125k <y<150k 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00
y > 150k 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00
Video Share = 40% Video Share = 60%
Income (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Rage
y < 20k - 0.79 0.84 0.87 0.90
20k < y <30k - 0.86 0.88 - 0.90 0.92
30k < y <40k - - 0.91 0.92 - 0.95 0.96
40k < y <50k - 0.04 0.97 0.98 - 0.04 0.99 0.99
50k < y <60k 0.01 0.09 0.99 0.99 0.01 0.09 1.00 1.00
60k < y <70k 0.02 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.02 0.20 1.00 1.00
70k < y <80k 0.09 0.54 1.00 1.00 0.09 0.54 1.00 1.00
80k < y <90k 0.14 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.76 1.00 1.00
90k<y<100k 0.34 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.34 0.92 1.00 1.00
100k < y <125k 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00
125k < y <150k 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00
y > 150k 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
[Vol. 3:1
FORD, KOUTSKY, SPIWAK
Percent of Homes Passed
Discount Rate = 12% Discount Rate = 8%
income (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Range _____________
y < 20k - 0.79 0.85 0.88 0.91
20k < y <30k - 0.86 0.88 - 0.02 0.90 0.92
30k < y <40k - 0.91 0.92 - 0.06 0.95 0.96
40k < y <50k - 0.97 0.98 0.01 0.14 0.99 0.99
50k < y <60k - 0.03 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.28 1.00 1.00
60k < y <70k - 0.04 1.00 1.00 0.07 0.58 1.00 1.00
70k < y <80k 0.04 0.19 1.00 1.00 0.27 0.81 1.00 1.00
80k < y <90k 0.02 0.27 1.00 1.00 0.51 0.94 1.00 1.00
90k < y <100k 0.18 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.00
100k < y <125k 0.54 0.83 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00
125k < y <150k 0.94 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00
y > 150k 0.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Discount Period = 20 years Discount Period = 10 years
Income (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d)
Range __________________________
y < 20k - - 0.88 0.91 - 0.73 0.80
20k < y <30k - 0.02 0.90 0.91 0.85 0.86
30k < y <40k 0.06 0.95 0.96 0.89 0.90
40k < y <50k - 0.13 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97
50k < y <60k 0.04 0.26 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.99
60k < y <70k 0.07 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 1.00
70k < y <80k 0.25 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.07 1.00 1.00
80k < y <90k 0.51 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.05 1.00 1.00
90k < y <100k 0.85 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.05 0.20 1.00 1.00
lOOk < y <125k 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.15 0.68 1.00 1.00
125k < y <150k 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.65 0.94 1.00 1.00
y > 150k 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.91 1.00 1.00
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